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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                            
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
         Sean Jenkins appeals his conviction on drug possession 
and related firearms charges.  He challenges the sufficiency of 
the evidence to establish his constructive possession of drugs 
found near him.  Because the evidence showed only that he was in 
an acquaintance's apartment physically near but not in actual 
possession of drugs and drug distribution paraphernalia, it does 
not support the jury's finding that he had dominion and control 
over the drugs.  We will, therefore, reverse Jenkins' conviction 
on all counts. 
 
                                I. 
         Around 1:30 a.m. on February 10, 1994, Philadelphia 
police officers Michael Kopecki and James Santomieri responded to 
a call that shots were being fired near an apartment building.  
Entering the courtyard of the building, the officers saw Kevin 
Jones and Larry Harrison, who was holding a handgun.  Kopecki 
yelled, "Police!"  Harrison ran into the building, and the 
officers chased him through a fire escape door, down a hallway, 
and into apartment C-107.  The front door opened into the living 
room, and the officers found Sam Stallings and Jenkins seated on 
a couch, both wearing only boxer shorts and a t-shirt.  On the 
coffee table before them were three bags of white powder 
containing a total of 55.3 grams of cocaine and 42 grams of non- 
cocaine white powder, two triple-beam scales, two loaded .38 
caliber revolvers, small ziplock-style bags, clear plastic vials, 
and numerous red caps.  On the floor was a loaded sawed-off 
shotgun.   
         None of the cocaine powder had been put in the bags, 
vials, or caps, and there was no evidence that either man had 
been working with the cocaine.  No grinders, razor blades, or 
other "cutting" implements, were on the table, and no pots or 
other instruments that could be used to cook cocaine were found 
with any cocaine residue.  No cocaine residue was found on 
Stallings or Jenkins, including their hands, and no residue was 
found on the scales.  Nothing concerning Jenkins' clothing 
suggested any connection to the drugs.  Finally, he made no 
attempt to hide or destroy the contraband, and fully cooperated 
with the officers.   
         Stallings and Jenkins were charged and tried together.  
Count I of the indictment charged them with possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1), 
and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C.  2.  Count II charged 
them with use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.  924(c), and aiding and 
abetting.  At trial, the officers testified to what they saw and 
found, as described above.  An expert witness, DEA agent Ellis 
Hershowitz, testified that the scales, bags and vials were 
commonly used by drug traffickers in repackaging drugs for 
resale.  On cross-examination, Hershowitz acknowledged that 
instruments necessary to cut and apportion the cocaine and insert 
it into the various packages were not found in the apartment.  
The manager of the apartment building, Barbara Edward, identified 
Stallings as a tenant in C-107, Harrison as someone who lived 
there, and Jenkins as someone who was "in and out" with Stallings 
and Harrison.  Neither defendant testified. 
         The jury found Jenkins guilty on both counts.  He made 
a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal or new trial.  
Although recognizing that proximity to contraband or association 
with someone in possession is by itself insufficient to find 
constructive possession, the court denied the motion.  It found 
three factors from which a jury could infer dominion and control:  
(i) Jenkins was not merely in the same apartment as the drugs, 
but was sitting on a couch immediately adjacent the table on 
which the drugs were found; (ii) while there was no evidence that 
Jenkins was a resident of the apartment, he was in his boxer 
shorts and a t-shirt at 1:30 a.m., which suggests that he was 
going to stay overnight or had been there for some time; and 
(iii) there were two triple-beam scales, from which it could be 
inferred that Stallings and Jenkins were each going to use a 
scale.  The court sentenced the defendant to nearly 12 years 
imprisonment. 
 
                               II. 
         In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government, and we will affirm the conviction if a rational trier 
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 615 (1993).  The district court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291.  The notice of appeal 
was timely filed. 
 
                               III. 
                                A. 
         The government had no evidence of actual possession of 
the cocaine powder; consequently, the issue before us is whether 
there was evidence sufficient to establish constructive 
possession.  Under our precedent, the evidence must show that 
Jenkins had dominion and control over the drugs: 
         [T]he government must submit sufficient 
         evidence to support an inference that the 
         individual "knowingly has both the power and 
         the intention at a given time to exercise 
         dominion or control over a thing, either 
         directly or through another person or 
         persons.  Constructive possession necessarily 
         requires both 'dominion and control' over an 
         object and knowledge of that object's 
         existence."  United States v. Iafelice, 978 
         F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations 
         omitted) . . . . 
 
Brown, 3 F.3d at 680.  The kind of evidence that can establish 
dominion and control includes, for example, evidence that the 
defendant attempted to hide or to destroy the contraband, seeUnited States 
v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1034-36 (3d Cir. 1972), or 
that the defendant lied to police about his identity or the 
source of large amounts of cash on his person, see United States 
v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 932 (1989).  Dominion and control are not established, 
however, by "mere proximity to the drug, or mere presence on the 
property where it is located or mere association with the person 
who does control the drug or the property."  Brown, 3 F.3d at 
680; see also United States v. Dunlap, 28 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
         Jenkins argues that the evidence relied upon by the 
court was insufficient to prove dominion and control over the 
cocaine.  Nothing but proximity links him to the drugs and drug 
distribution paraphernalia.  No cocaine residue was found on him, 
nor were his fingerprints found on the drugs.  His prior 
acquaintance with Stallings answers why he was in the apartment, 
and it is immaterial how long he had been or was going to be 
there.  The presence of the two scales, he contends, is 
insufficient to link him to the drugs.  No evidence suggests that 
they had been in use or were about to be used by him; if 
anything, it was more likely that the two scales belonged to and 
would be used by the two residents of the apartment. 
         We agree with the defendant that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish his possession of the cocaine.  The 
evidence does show that he is an acquaintance of Stallings and 
Harrison and that he was found physically near drugs and drug 
distribution paraphernalia, including two scales, but those are 
insufficient facts from which to infer dominion and control over 
the drugs. 
         We find this case controlled by our decision in United 
States v. Brown.  The police, acting on a tip, searched Brown's 
home for drugs.  During the search, Ama Baltimore arrived at the 
house, inserted a key into the lock, and was arrested as she 
entered.  While being arrested, she protested, "But you can't 
arrest me because I am in my own house."  In the upstairs sewing 
room, the police found a pair of shorts and a switchblade, both 
of which Baltimore admitted were hers.  Substantial quantities of 
heroin, cocaine powder, and crack cocaine were found in the 
refrigerator in the kitchen, the kitchen closet, and one of the 
upstairs bedrooms.  Equipment and supplies to prepare, cook, cut 
and distribute the drugs were also found in the bedroom.  The 
government contended that several facts were sufficient to 
establish Baltimore's possession of the drugs: her possession of 
a key to the house, her attempted entry, the presence of the 
shorts and switchblade in the house, her statement, and the fact 
that the house was a known "cut house," a place where large 
quantities of drugs are cut and distributed. 
         We overturned her conviction for insufficient evidence 
of possession.  The evidence showed that she had access to or 
resided in the house and knew of the presence of the drugs, but 
did not show she had dominion and control them.  The key, her 
attempted entry, and her statement merely showed that she had 
some control over the house, not the drugs.  See 3 F.3d at 682- 
83.  We further noted that her fingerprints were not found on the 
drugs or drug paraphernalia, and there was no evidence that she 
ever exerted any indirect control over them.  See id.  Evidence 
in addition to knowledge of and access to the drugs was necessary 
to prove possession.  The fact that Brown's home was a "cut 
house" did not suffice as additional evidence.  Because Brown's 
house was also a residence, the jury could not infer from the 
fact that Brown's home was a "cut house," that beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Baltimore was a participant in the drug 
distribution operation.  See id. at 683-84. 
         The government stresses that in Brown we noted that 
Baltimore and her shorts were not found in the same room as any 
of the drugs.  See 3 F.3d at 683.  The government contends that 
this factor was highly relevant to our decision, but we disagree.  
It is a serious misreading of that decision to conclude that the 
degree of proximity of Baltimore or her clothing to the drugs was 
a controlling factor.  Although our decision does not discuss 
this point in detail, Baltimore acknowledged at the time of her 
arrest that she lived in the cut house, and in the course of 
residing there, it is virtually certain that she regularly would 
have entered the kitchen and bedroom, the rooms in which the 
drugs were found.  Since we concluded that her residence in the 
cut house was insufficient to prove dominion and control over the 
drugs, it would not have mattered if there had been evidence that 
she had visited the kitchen or bedroom, so long as the evidence 
did not also show that her visit pertained to the drugs.    
         Our decision in Brown is consistent with the 
jurisprudence of other circuits.  In United States v. Vasquez- 
Chan, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found evidence 
of drug possession insufficient even though there was proof that 
the defendant had access to and was in close proximity with large 
quantities of drugs.  Drug Enforcement Agency officers arranged 
the purchase of a large amount of cocaine.  They observed the 
drugs being transported from a particular house and went to 
secure the residence.  Inside, they found two women, a 
housekeeper and an apparent house guest, Julia Gaxiola-Castillo 
(Gaxiola).  Gaxiola waived her rights and told the officers that 
she was a friend of the housekeeper and had been staying there a 
few weeks with her infant child.  In the bedroom where she had 
been staying, the officers found 600 kilograms of cocaine in 55 
gallon drums.  On six of the drums, including the inside of the 
lid of one drum, they found her fingerprints.  She was convicted 
of conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to distribute. 
         The Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction for lack of 
evidence of possession.  She claimed that she had come to visit 
her friend, and she and her child had to sleep somewhere, and the 
bedroom with the cocaine may have been the only place to stay.  
Although the defendant had been caught in "extremely 
incriminating circumstances" due to her proximity to the drugs, 
her behavior "was perfectly consistent with that of an innocent 
person having no stake or interest in the transactions."  978 
F.2d at 551 (citations omitted).  Proximity and knowledge of the 
existence and location of the drugs were insufficient to prove 
dominion and control.  See id.  The fingerprints by themselves 
proved nothing but the fact that she had used the bedroom.  It 
was perfectly reasonable to believe that she would have come into 
contact with the numerous canisters as she moved in and out of 
the room, or prepared a place to sleep.  See id. 
         Similarly, in United States v. Dunlap, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found proximity to drugs under 
very suspicious circumstances insufficient to support a finding 
of possession.  Acting on a tip that drugs were being sold from 
Eric Dunlap's apartment, police officers secured a search 
warrant.  As they approached his door, Dunlap opened the door 
from the inside.  Standing behind Dunlap was Cornelius Coleman, 
who had a handgun in his pocket.  In the kitchen, the officers 
found large amounts of cocaine power and cocaine base, and some 
of the powder was in the process of being cooked.  Coleman's hat 
was also in the kitchen, and more drugs and drug distribution 
paraphernalia were found in the apartment.  Coleman was convicted 
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. 
         The Eighth Circuit overturned his conviction because 
the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Coleman had constructive possession.  See28 F.3d at 
826.  His mere presence in the apartment, including 
the evidence that he may have been in the kitchen, did not prove 
that he possessed the cocaine.  He may have been visiting Dunlap 
to purchase cocaine for his own use, an offense not charged, and 
it was speculative for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he possessed the drugs, or intended to aid and abet 
Dunlap in his drug operation.  See id. at 827. 
         The evidence supporting constructive possession in Sean 
Jenkins' case is no stronger than the evidence found insufficient 
in Brown, Vasquez-Chan, and Dunlap.  In each of those cases, the 
evidence did not establish the decisive nexus of dominion and 
control between the defendant and the contraband.  The district 
court believed that Jenkins' being on the couch next to the drugs 
was decisively different than if he was somewhere else in the 
apartment, but proximity alone is not enough, no matter how near 
that proximity is.  Without other proof of dominion and control, 
we can only conclude that it was sheer happenstance that Jenkins 
was seated on the couch next to the cocaine when the police 
entered the apartment.  Whether or not he possessed the drugs, he 
could have been found sitting on the couch, standing next to it, 
in the bathroom, or in some other room in the apartment.  A 
reasonable jury may not infer dominion and control beyond a 
reasonable doubt from the defendant's physical distance from the 
drugs alone. 
         Jenkins' presence near the drugs in his acquaintance's 
apartment is analogous to Baltimore's control over the cut house 
and access to the drugs, Gaxiola's proximity and contact with the 
drugs, and Coleman's proximity to drugs and drug activity.  Some 
additional evidence of dominion and control is required before a 
finding of constructive possession can be made beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  We do not believe that Jenkins' being in boxer 
shorts and a t-shirt or the fact that two scales were on the 
table can raise the necessary inference.  That he had been in the 
apartment long enough to get partially undressed and that he was 
planning to stay for some time tell us nothing about what he had 
been doing or what he planned to do.  We do not know who brought 
the drugs and equipment into the apartment, or who set up the 
items on the coffee table.  No fingerprint evidence connected him 
with the items on the coffee table, the drug distribution 
paraphernalia were not in use, and no cocaine residue was found 
on him.  Perhaps most important, as agent Hershowitz testified, 
the cutting and repackaging of the cocaine could not have been 
imminent for lack of tools to cut, apportion and package the 
powder.  Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could not 
conclude from Jenkins' state of undress that, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, he had dominion and control over the drugs and intended to 
participate in the distribution of the cocaine at some point that 
night. 
         The existence of two scales rather than one adds very 
little to the evidence against Jenkins.  It does suggest that 
someone in addition to Stallings would have participated in the 
drug cutting and repackaging that night, if such activity were to 
occur.  As we have concluded, however, there is no evidence that 
the drug activities were imminent; consequently, it would be 
impermissible to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
Jenkins who would have helped Stallings rather than Harrison or 
Jones, both of whom resided in the apartment. 
         The government relies on our decisions in United States 
v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972) and United States v. 
Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1992).  In both cases, however, 
there were significant and substantial factors linking the 
defendants to the drugs.  In Davis, the defendant was convicted 
for possessing heroin that had been seized in her apartment.  
Unlike the instant case, in Davis the evidence clearly showed 
that someone had been recently packaging the drugs, and when the 
police forced their way in, the persons present, including the 
defendant, had tried to destroy the drugs.  461 F.2d at 1036-38.  
Here, Jenkins was in an acquaintance's apartment and no evidence 
suggests that he had recently physically interacted with the 
drugs or drug paraphernalia.  Neither did he attempt to hide or 
destroy the drugs.  In Iafelice, the defendant drove several 
individuals in his car to a pre-arranged drug sale to undercover 
agents, and was convicted for possession of heroin.  We upheld 
the conviction and found relevant that he drove the car in a 
suspicious manner, transported the drugs and those who sold the 
drugs to the point of sale, assisted in opening the trunk where 
the drugs were located, and was called in the car by one of the 
principal drug dealers during the sale.  See Iafelice, 978 F.2d 
at 95-98.  Here, the cocaine was not found in Jenkins' residence, 
and no evidence suggests his active participation in any drug 
distribution. 
         A sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires us to 
take a careful look at the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government.  Because the evidence supporting Jenkins' 
possession of the cocaine, viewed in that light, does not amount 
to more than close proximity to the drugs and acquaintance with 
the residents of the apartment in which the drugs were found, we 
must reverse his conviction for possession with intent to 
distribute. 
 
                                B. 
         Jenkins was also convicted for using a firearm in 
connection with a drug trafficking crime.  Section 924(c)(1) of 
Title 18 provides, in relevant part, that any person who "during 
and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or 
carries a firearm" is subject to a mandatory 10-year sentence "in 
addition to" the punishment for the predicate offense.  Jenkins 
argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for 
a judgment of acquittal on this count because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the conviction of the predicate 
drug offense. 
         Commission of a drug trafficking offense is an element 
of the crime described in  924(c)(1), and must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 59 
F.3d 1323, 1326 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 542 (1995); 
United States v. Nelson, 27 F.3d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1994).  
Because the government has not met its burden of proof on the 
predicate offense, Jenkins' conviction for using a firearm in 
connection with a drug offense must be also be reversed. 
 
                                C. 
         Both counts of the indictment list aiding and abetting 
as theories of liability, and we must consider the possibility 
that the jury premised its verdict on these alternatives.  To 
convict of aiding and abetting, the government must show that the 
defendant "in some [way] associate[d] himself with the venture, 
that he participate[d] in it as in something that he wishe[d] to 
bring about, that he [sought] by his action to make it succeed."  
United States v. Bey, 736 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)) 
(alterations in original). 
         Here, the government had to prove that another person 
committed the principal offense and that Jenkins aided and 
abetted in the commission of that offense.  At trial, the 
government offered no evidence other than the evidence to support 
constructive possession by Jenkins.  His close proximity to the 
drugs and firearms, state of dress, and acquaintance with 
Stallings, who committed the principal offense, are not 
sufficient to prove aiding and abetting.  The government simply 
has a "snapshot" of Jenkins sitting on a couch in an 
acquaintance's apartment next to a table laden with drugs and 
firearms.  The evidence does not show that Jenkins associated 
himself with or participated in the drug distribution, or that he 
took any action to help it succeed.  The "snapshot" does not show 
that he took any actions other than to enter the apartment, get 
partially undressed, and sit on the couch.  Consequently, the 
jury could not have properly convicted Jenkins of aiding and 
abetting. 
 
                               IV. 
         Because we have concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence for the jury to convict Sean Jenkins of possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute, use of a firearm in connection 
with a drug offense, and aiding and abetting, we will reverse his 
convictions. 
United States of America v. Sean Jenkins, Appellant 
No. 95-1606 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
         Today the majority holds that, when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no 
rational jury could possibly conclude that a man in his underwear 
sitting on a sofa that is surrounded by cocaine, assorted drug 
paraphernalia and firearms can be guilty of a possessory offense 
under the constructive possession doctrine.  I believe that this 
record contains sufficient evidence for a rational jury to 
conclude that appellant Sean Jenkins constructively possessed 
cocaine with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 
U.S.C.  841(a)(1), based upon what the police saw when they 
entered Sam Stallings' apartment in pursuit of an armed felon.  
Because the majority reaches a contrary result, I respectfully 
dissent.     
                                I. 
         The facts of this case are not in dispute.  In its June 
6, 1995 order denying Jenkins' post-trial motion for a judgment 
of acquittal, the district court described the circumstances 
under which the police entered the apartment in question and what 
they saw when they arrived: 
         Michael Kopecki, a Philadelphia police 
         officer, testified that on February 10, 1994, 
         at 1:30 a.m., he and his partner responded to 
         a call that gunshots were being fired outside 
         the West Walnut Lane Apartments.  Kopecki 
         testified that he parked his patrol car and 
         moved toward the courtyard between two of the 
         buildings, where he saw Larry Harrison with a 
         gun and Kevin Jones with him.  Kopecki yelled 
         "police."  Harrison and Jones ran toward the 
         building.  Kopecki followed Harrison into the 
         building through a fire escape door and down 
         a short hallway into apartment C-107.  When 
         he entered the apartment, defendants Jenkins 
         and Stallings were seated on the couch in the 
         living room;  they were wearing boxer shorts 
         and T-shirts.  On the coffee table in front 
         of them were two triple-beam scales, two .38- 
         caliber revolvers, three bags of white 
         powder, small colored ziplock-style bags, 
         clear plastic vials, and numerous red caps.  
         Defendants stipulated that the powder totaled 
         55.3 grams of cocaine and 42 grams of non- 
         cocaine powder.  A Winchester 12-gauge 
         shotgun with a sawed-off barrel was on the 
         floor to the side of the couch.  All of the 
         guns were loaded. 
 
United States v. Jenkins, No. 94-385-02, slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. 
Pa. June 6, 1995).     
                               II. 
         "Constructive possession is a legal fiction created by 
courts to find possession where it does not exist in fact."  
Michael S. Deal, Note, United States v. Walker:  Constructive 
Possession of Controlled Substances:  Pushing the Limits of 
Exclusive Control, 2 J. Pharmacy & L. 401, 401 (1994).  "The 
judicially created doctrine of constructive possession enables 
law enforcement officials to prosecute individuals in situations 
where the inference of possession is strong, yet actual 
possession at the time of arrest cannot be shown."  Mark I. 
Rabinowitz, Note, Criminal Law Constructive Possession:  Must the 
Commonwealth Still Prove Intent?--Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 60 
Temple L.Q. 445, 449-50 (1987).  Our case law holds that a 
finding of guilt based upon constructive possession "requires 
both `dominion and control' over an object and knowledge of that 
object's existence."  United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d 
Cir.) (quoting United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d 
Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 615 (1993).  We have 
further held that the terms "dominion and control" are to be 
interpreted "as the ability to reduce an object to actual 
possession . . . ."  United States v. Martorano, 709 F.2d 863, 
869 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 993, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983).  
See Black's Law Dictionary 314 (6th ed. 1990) (Constructive 
possession "[e]xists when one does not have physical custody or 
possession, but is in a position to exercise dominion and control 
over a thing.");  see also George H. Singer, Note, Constructive 
Possession of Controlled Substances:  A North Dakota Look At a 
Nationwide Problem, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 981, 1002 (1992) (hereinafter 
Constructive Possession) (In those courts that have defined 
constructive possession "to include a right, a capacity, or an 
ability to reduce the substance to one's control[,] . . . an 
accused need not be presently exercising his or her right to 
control the contraband at the time of arrest;  it is enough that 
he or she could have done so.").   
         Our cases have held that "dominion and control" of 
narcotics "need not be exclusive but may be shared with others."  
United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1035 (3d Cir. 1972).  A 
finding of dominion and control, however, may not be premised 
only upon "mere proximity to the drug, or mere presence on the 
property where it is located or mere association with the person 
who does control the drug or the property . . . ."  Brown, 3 F.3d 
at 680 (quoting Davis, 461 F.2d at 1036). 
         "Our standard of review in sufficiency of the evidence 
claims is deferential. . . . `[T]he relevant question is whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"   
United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 69-70 (3d Cir.) 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 
2789 (1979)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995, 110 S. Ct. 546 (1989).  
This deferential test "places a very heavy burden on the 
appellant."  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 
1995).        
                               III. 
                                A. 
         There is sufficient evidence in this record to affirm 
Jenkins' conviction on criminal possession charges under 21 
U.S.C.  841(a)(1).  The reasoning and analysis of the district 
court on the constructive possession issue were sound and should 
not have been disturbed on appeal.  The district court rejected 
the same insufficiency argument, citing the following 
considerations: 
         First, Jenkins was not merely in the same 
         apartment where the cocaine and guns were 
         found.  Nor was he merely in the same room 
         where the items happened to be hidden or 
         stored.  Rather, he was sitting immediately 
         behind a coffee table piled with drugs, 
         paraphernalia, and loaded weapons. . . . 
         Second, while there was no evidence that 
         Jenkins was a resident of the apartment, the 
         jury could have reasonably inferred that he 
         was not merely stopping by Stallings' 
         apartment on February 10 and happened to find 
         Stallings involved in drug activity.  
         Jenkins, on a winter night at 1:30 a.m., was 
         wearing boxer shorts and a T-shirt, which 
         could imply that he was staying over in the 
         apartment or had been there long enough to 
         get comfortable.  Moreover, the building 
         manager testified that Jenkins was in and out 
         of the apartment with Stallings and Harrison 
         on different occasions.  It would have been 
         reasonable for a jury to conclude that 
         defendant was a frequent visitor in the 
         apartment and a participant in the activities 
         inside.  Third, there were two triple-beam 
         balances on the coffee table and two people 
         seated behind the table.  From these facts 
         the jury could have inferred that Jenkins and 
         Stallings each was using a scale . . . .  
 
Jenkins, No. 94-385-02, slip op. at 6-7.  The district court 
further held that there was  
 
         sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
         conclude that the drugs were possessed with 
         the intent to distribute them.  In addition 
         to the cocaine on the table, there were two 
         scales, a powdered cutting agent, plastic 
         baggies, vials, and caps.  An expert 
         testified that these materials are used in 
         preparing, weighing, and packaging drugs for 
         street sale. . . . Even if the police did not 
         happen to catch the defendants in the act of 
         placing cocaine in baggies or vials . . . the 
         tools of the distribution trade were in 
         evidence and readily available.  Thus I find 
         that there was sufficient evidence to support 
         the jury's finding that Jenkins possessed the 
         cocaine with the intent to distribute it. 
 
Id. at 7-8.  While I agree with the district court's disposition 
of the constructive possession issue, I will now elaborate upon a 
number of additional points that provide further support for the 
conclusion that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
affirm Jenkins' conviction.      
                                1. 
         The question whether a defendant constructively 
possessed narcotics requires a careful examination of the facts.  
See Constructive Possession, supra, at 1008 ("The analysis under 
the constructive possession doctrine is necessarily fact-driven.  
As no one evidentiary factor standing alone is conclusively 
demonstrative, it must be inferred from the totality of 
circumstances of a particular case.").  In this case, the 
situation in which the police found Jenkins, by all appearances, 
provided devastating indicia of his guilt.  When the police 
entered the apartment, they found Jenkins in the center of a drug 
distribution enterprise.  Jenkins had comfortably ensconced 
himself within an arm's reach of firearms, narcotics, drug 
paraphernalia and other tools of the narcotics trade.  From this 
vantage point, Jenkins had easy access to all the contraband that 
surrounded him and appeared to have the complete trust of the 
tenants of the apartment in which this unlawful enterprise was 
carried on.  Under these uncontested facts, and viewing this 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 
rational jury could have concluded that Jenkins had "the ability 
to reduce [the cocaine] to actual possession . . . ."  Martorano, 
709 F.2d at 869.  
                                2. 
         The majority's analysis seems to treat all forms of 
proximity as having the same probative value and offers no 
opinion as to whether Jenkins' position within grabbing range of 
all the contraband in the apartment is to be given any weight at 
all in our analysis.  Although I recognize that proximity, 
standing alone and without any other incriminating circumstances, 
is insufficient as a matter of law to convict a defendant on 
criminal possession charges, Brown, 3 F.3d at 680, this does not 
mean that the degree of proximity is irrelevant.  On the 
contrary, considered along with other attendant circumstances, 
proximity can support a judgment of conviction for criminal 
possession.     
         Close proximity to narcotics is an evidential, 
inculpatory factor that can support a finding of guilt on 
criminal possession charges to a greater or lesser degree.  See, 
e.g., Brown, 3 F.3d at 683 (distinguishing our decision in United 
States v. Davis, supra, where a constructive possession 
conviction was upheld on the ground that the defendant in Davis"was 
present with her co-defendant in the room and next to the 
table where the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found");  
United States v. Evers, 448 F.2d 863, 866 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 405 U.S. 928, 92 S. Ct. 979 (1972).  In the instant case, 
the defendant voluntarily situated himself in a position where 
narcotics, firearms, drug packaging materials and various other 
tools of the drug-dealing trade were "within his immediate 
reach."  United States v. Bonham, 477 F.2d 1137, 1138 (3d Cir. 
1973).  This is a significant and highly probative evidentiary 
fact.  See Parker v. United States, 601 A.2d 45, 51 n.18 (D.C. 
App. 1991) (rejecting a legal sufficiency challenge, the court 
observed that the case was "a diminished version of many 
constructive possession cases, in that the contraband was within 
the actual immediate reach of both defendants");  United States 
v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing our 
decision in United States v. Davis, supra, on the ground that 
defendant "was not discovered in the immediate area of 
unconcealed narcotics"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016, 96 S. Ct. 
449 (1975).  This factor is particularly telling in a case such 
as this where Jenkins comfortably settled himself in the center 
of a drug distribution network.    
         In concluding that Jenkins was "merely present" in the 
apartment, the majority stresses what it found to be the fortuity 
of Jenkins' presence in such a compromising position.  The 
majority goes on to conclude that "[w]hether or not [Jenkins] 
possessed the drugs, he could have been found sitting on the 
couch, standing next to it, in the bathroom, or in some other 
room in the apartment."  Majority Typescript at 12.  This 
statement is puzzling.  The possibility that Jenkins couldconceivably have 
been found in any one of these places had the 
police entered the apartment at a different time is irrelevant.  
Indeed, if the police had shown up either earlier or later, 
Jenkins might not even have been in the apartment at all!  It is 
axiomatic that a criminal is not entitled to go free merely 
because the constable showed up at an inconvenient time.  This 
type of "bad luck" does not warrant granting Jenkins the windfall 
of a blanket acquittal. 
                                3.                                                                                     
         The majority further concludes that Jenkins' 
"acquaintance" with Stallings and Harrison cannot give rise to an 
inference of constructive possession.  The majority is correct to 
the extent that mere association, standing alone, will not 
support a conviction premised upon the constructive possession 
doctrine.  Brown, 3 F.3d at 680.  This does not mean, however, 
that all types of associations with criminals are innocent and 
cannot support a finding of constructive possession.  In the 
present case, Jenkins was, at a minimum, on excellent terms with 
narcotics traffickers who were openly plying their trade.  This 
uncontested fact raises for our consideration a principle 
recognized by our sister circuits, which acknowledge that in this 
type of environment, "[t]he jury . . . could have reasonably 
determined that only trusted members of the operation would be 
permitted entry into the apartment, because allowing outsiders to 
have access to an apartment with large quantities of narcotics in 
plain view could compromise the security of the operation."  
United States v. Soto, 959 F.2d 1181, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992). 
         Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
has observed that "presence, proximity or association may 
establish a prima facie case of drug-possession when colored by 
evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of 
which that possession is a part."  United States v. Staten, 581 
F.2d 878, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  The Staten court also made the 
common-sense pronouncement, equally applicable here, that the 
defendant's presence in an "apartment reeking with the tell-tale 
indicia of an ongoing drug-distributing enterprise could 
rationally have been viewed as a privilege reserved exclusively 
for participants."  Id.  In such a situation, "[i]t would seem 
that the voluntary presence of the accused in an area obviously 
devoted to preparation of drugs for distribution is a 
circumstance potently indicative of his involvement in the 
operation."  Id. n.67 (emphasis added).  See United States v. 
Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 72 (D.C. Cir.) (noting that presence is 
"especially significant" in this context), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
953, 112 S. Ct. 408 (1991);  see also State v. Brown, 404 A.2d 
1111, 1114 (N.J. 1979) (rejecting argument that defendant was 
"merely present" as "[t]here were other evidential circumstances 
lending distinctive color to the character of defendant's 
presence at the scene."). 
         These inculpatory factors, considered together, provide 
a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a rational jury to 
conclude that Jenkins violated 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1).  I will now 
turn to my disagreement with the majority regarding the degree of 
deference our standard of review requires us to accord the jury's 
factual conclusions as to Jenkins' guilt.     
                               B.   
         An analysis of the majority's opinion reveals that the 
court most certainly does not view the record evidence "in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution."  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 
319, 99 S. Ct. 2789.  Quite to the contrary, the majority has 
elected not only to reject the inferences that the jury made as 
to what Jenkins was doing in the apartment, but has gone so far 
as to view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendant.  This misapplication of the burden of proof undermines 
the majority's entire analysis of the insufficiency issue.   
         For example, the majority concludes that Jenkins' 
"prior acquaintance with Stallings answers why he was in the 
apartment . . . ."  Majority Typescript at 6-7.  Continuing along 
these lines, the majority opines that "we can only conclude that 
it was sheer happenstance that Jenkins was seated on the couch 
next to the cocaine when the police entered the apartment."  Id.at 11-12.  
A rational jury, however, would be free to, and did, 
reject the majority's suggested inferences.  Indeed, the 
majority's second-guessing runs entirely counter to the burden 
that Jenkins must satisfy to prevail on his motion for acquittal.  
It would appear that the majority has embarked upon an 
unauthorized exercise of post hoc appellate fact-finding to 
explain, to its own satisfaction at least, the "real" reasons for 
Jenkins' presence in the apartment.  In so doing, it has 
literally reversed the established rule as to which party has the 
burden of proof.  We are not in the business of overriding a 
jury's conclusions, based upon a highly selective interpretation 
of the facts viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant. 
         Similarly, the majority concludes that the presence of 
two scales in front of Jenkins does not link him to the drugs 
because they were not being used at the time of police entry and 
"it was more likely that the two scales belonged to and would be 
used by the two residents of the apartment."  Id. at 7.  As 
Jenkins did not actually live in the apartment, the majority 
appears to believe that the fact he was found seated directly in 
front of the type of scale commonly used to weigh narcotics (that 
was in the immediate vicinity of narcotics) need not concern us 
here.  The majority also appears to believe that since the police 
came upon two triple-beam scales, a rational jury could infer 
only that the drug activity that occurred in the apartment was 
carried on by two people who lived in the apartment.  Since 
Jenkins was a mere guest, so the argument goes, a rational jury 
could not conclude that he was one of the two participants 
involved in drug distribution, even though Jenkins was one of the 
two people in the room when the police entered the apartment.   
         The presence of two scales obviously does not lead to 
an a fortiori conclusion that only two people could have been 
involved in the narcotics distribution enterprise that was 
conducted out of Stallings' apartment.  It is not as though the 
police saw two tea cups and two bowls of porridge sitting on a 
table with two place settings.  A rational jury could conclude 
that the drug-dealing operation conducted out of Stallings' 
apartment was not a "two-man show."   As courts have recognized, 
a narcotics distribution scheme "necessarily involves multiple 
individuals."   Parker, 601 A.2d at 52.  Moreover, the two scales 
were not the only drug-related items in the apartment.  The 
apartment also contained three firearms and many items of drug- 
dealing paraphernalia, all within Jenkins' sight and reach.  
Furthermore, the majority's narrow interpretation of the 
permissible inferences that a rational jury could draw from the 
presence of two triple-beam scales in the apartment on the table 
in front of Jenkins fails to evaluate the record evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution.  
                              C.    
         The majority contends that our decision in United 
States v. Brown, 3 F.3d at 673, is controlling and requires that 
we overturn Jenkins' criminal possession conviction.  I disagree.  
Brown is clearly distinguishable from this case.  Ama Baltimore, 
the defendant in Brown whose conviction was overturned on legal 
insufficiency grounds, was arrested as she was about to enter the 
front door of a house in which the police were executing a search 
warrant.  Baltimore lived in the house.  The police seized large 
amounts of narcotics in the house, but none in any areas of the 
house in which personal items belonging to Baltimore were found. 
         In the district court Baltimore was, like Jenkins, 
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute.  We reversed.  This result was premised upon the fact 
that Baltimore was nowhere near narcotics when she was arrested, 
the room in which Baltimore's possessions were found was drug- 
free and the attendant circumstances that surrounded her arrest 
did not adequately support a conclusion that she was an active 
participant in the criminal activities that occurred within the 
house.   
         Although the majority attempts to minimize the emphasis 
that the Brown court placed upon the potential significance of 
the proximity factor, see Majority Typescript at 8, its efforts 
are unpersuasive.  In support of its decision to overturn the 
criminal possession charges against Baltimore, the Brown court 
relied, inter alia, upon the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993).  The Brown court cited as an exculpatory factor in 
that case the fact that the defendant "was not found in the room 
where the crack cocaine was found . . . ."  Brown, 3 F. 3d at 
682.  Moreover, the Brown court distinguished our decision in 
United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d at 1026, in which a finding of 
constructive possession was upheld, on the ground that "[t]he 
defendant in Davis was present with her co-defendant in the room 
and next to the table where the drugs and drug paraphernalia were 
found."  Brown, 3 F.3d at 683. 
         In its analysis of whether there was sufficient 
evidence in the record to support Baltimore's conviction, the 
Brown court looked to where Baltimore was in relation to the 
contraband that the authorities had seized when she was arrested, 
and to the areas of the house where she arguably had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy.  See id. ("neither [Baltimore] nor any of 
her possessions were found in any of the rooms where the drugs 
were seized").  Baltimore was nowhere near the drugs when she was 
arrested, nor were any of her personal possessions located in the 
house's drug-processing areas.  The Brown case, therefore, lacked 
the present case's immediate proximity to the contraband, 
considered along with the other incriminating attendant 
circumstances that gave rise to a permissible inference that 
Jenkins committed the crime charged. 
         It is possible, of course, for a person to live in a 
house in which narcotics trafficking is taking place without 
being involved in the operation itself.  Brown recognized this, 
as did the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(Reinhardt, J.), another case upon which the majority relies 
heavily.  Although such living arrangements are foolish, they are 
not necessarily criminal.  Brown recognized that people living in 
a house or apartment with multiple tenants may have their own 
separate spheres of activity and personal agendas.   
         The rationale that underlies Brown, however, does not 
help Jenkins.  The record in this case can reasonably be 
interpreted to support the conclusion that Jenkins' personal 
connection with the area of the apartment that was the hub of a 
small-scale narcotics distribution enterprise was that of a 
trusted insider on familiar territory.  Therefore, a rational 
jury could have concluded that Jenkins was a member in good 
standing of criminal narcotics distribution operation when the 
police entered Stallings' apartment on February 15, 1994. 
                               IV. 
         Our decision in United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 
92, which discusses how a rational jury could analyze the 
circumstantial evidence presented in constructive possession 
cases, is also instructive here: 
              It is not unusual that the government 
         will not have direct evidence.  Knowledge is 
         often proven by circumstances.  A case can be 
         built against the defendant grain-by-grain 
         until the scale finally tips;  and 
         considering all the facts and drawing upon 
         rational inferences therefrom, a reasonablejury could find beyond 
a reasonable doubt 
         that the defendant committed the crime for 
         which he is charged. 
 
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).  Since the evidence presented here 
effectively tipped the evidentiary scale, we are precluded from 
nullifying the jury's fact finding.   
         Although "other inferences are possible from the 
evidence, . . . that circumstance does not justify us in 
rejecting the jury's verdict."  United States v. Sandini, 888 
F.2d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089, 110 S. 
Ct. 1831 (1990).  Accord Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97 n.3 ("There is 
no requirement . . . that the inference drawn by the jury be the 
only inference possible or that the government's evidence 
foreclose every possible innocent explanation.").  The majority 
has interpreted the constructive possession doctrine far more 
restrictively than our case law warrants and has also failed to 
heed the Supreme Court's mandate to view the record evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution.  I would uphold 
Jenkins' conviction on criminal possession charges. 
 
 
